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DEFINING CYBERLIBEL: 1 A FIRST AMENDMENT
LIMIT FOR LIBEL SUITS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS
ARISING FROM COMPUTER BULLETIN BOARD
SPEECH
I. INTRODUCTION
Yesterday's vast, unlitigated frontier of computer-aided com-
munication is quickly becoming today and tomorrow's legal battle-
ground. Computer bulletin boards, in particular, have traditionally
been a sanctuary in which participants have generally been able to
express their views without fear of a retaliatory measure more
severe than a heated response. But, as one writer noted, "Like
Wyatt Earp arriving in Dodge City, law and order has come to
cyberspace."2 Participants on computer bulletin boards are starting
to resort to the legal system to resolve their disputes. Given the
free and fierce debates that characterize communication on com-
puter bulletin boards,3 the American legal system seems to be on
the verge of a litigation explosion regarding who, if anyone, should
pay when this communication causes harm.4
1. This term is intended as an offshoot of the term "cyberspace," and refers to libel
suits arising from messages posted on computer bulletin boards. Michael Benedikt, chair
of the University of Texas at Austin's Department of Agriculture, put forth a
representative definition of cyberspace as "globally networked, computer-sustained,
computer-accessed, and computer-generated, multi-dimensional, artificial, or 'virtual
reality."' Michael Benedikt, Cyberspace: Some Proposals, in CYBERSPACE: FIRST STEPS
199 (1991). Author William Gibson first popularized the term eyberspace. WiLuiAM
GIBSON, NEUROMANCER (1984); see also Eric Schlachter, Essay, Cyberspace, the Free
Market and the Free Marketplace of Ideas: Recognizing Legal Differences in Computer
Bulletin Board Functions, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 87, 89 n.1 (1993) (noting
Gibson's use of the term).
2. W. John Moore, Taming Cybersp'Zce, 24 NAT'L J. 745, 746 (1992).
3. See infra notes 29-37 and accompanying text (discussing the harsh, unregulated
nature of discussions on computer bulletin boards).
4. See Cyberspace Bulletin Boards, LDRC LiBELLE=ER (Libel Defense Resource Ctr.,
New York, N.Y.), May 1994, at 1 (stating that bulletin board systems "are part of the
new frontier for media lawyers"); Ian Barnes, Free Speech Caught in the Net?, INDEPEN-
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The commentary and litigation that exist on this subject have
almost exclusively focused on whether the operators of computer
bulletin boards can be held liable, consistent with the First Amend-
ment,' for defamatory statements made by users of their bulletin
boards.' However, an equally challenging set of First Amendment
questions is presented by the limits of liability of the users them-
selves. The task of this Note is to answer one of these questions
and propose a minimum standard that plaintiffs who are defamed
by statements posted on computer bulletin boards should be re-
quired to meet in order to prevail in a libel lawsuit. This Note pro-
poses that when the libel plaintiff has been defamed by a message
posted on a computer bulletin board, and he or she has access to
the bulletin board to post a reply, the First Amendment requires
that the plaintiff prove that the defendant acted with "actual mal-
ice" in defaming the plaintiff.
Part II of this Note explains computer bulletin board technolo-
gy and describes the types of bulletin board systems to which the
thesis of this Note applies. This section also explores the develop-
ment and rationale of the actual malice standard, which the Su-
DENT, Aug. 22, 1994, at 22 ("[T]he law is catching up with this so-called 'unregulated'
technology.").
5. The First Amendment provides in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. The only published case that deals with the applicability of libel law to computer
bulletin boards is Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, 776 F. Supp. 135, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
In Cubby, the court held that a bulletin board operator was a mere "distributor" of infor-
mation on the bulletin board, and thus could not be held liable for defamatory statements
posted on the bulletin board without a showing that it knew or had reason to know of
the defamation. This case, and the issue with which it dealt, has received extensive atten-
tion from legal scholars. See, e.g., Terri A. Cutrera, Computer Networks, Libel and the
First Amendment, 11 COMPuTER/LJ. 555 (1992); David J. Connor, Case Note, Cubby v.
Compuserve, Defamation Law on the Electronic Frontier, 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REv.
227 (1993); Robert B. Charles, The New World of On-Line Libel, MANHATrAN LAW.,
Dec. 1991, at 40. The reasoning set forth in Cubby, was followed in Stem v. Delphi
Interet Servs. Corp., 626 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Sup. Ct. 1995), which held that a company that
provided access to a computerized database service was a "news disseminator" analogous
to a news vendor, bookstore, or library. A recent case, however, held that the commercial
computer information system provider Prodigy was a "publisher" of allegedly libelous
statements made on one of its bulletin boards, and thus could be liable for the statements
as if it had originated the libel. See Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 23 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1794, 1795 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 25, 1995). In so holding, the court found a
distinction between its facts and those in Cubby in that Prodigy held itself out as control-
ling the contents of its bulletin boards and took steps to do so through an automatic
software screening program to delete postings that it deemed offensive or in "bad taste."
Thus, because Prodigy exercised editorial control over the content of its bulletin boards, it
more closely resembled a publisher than a distributor of information. Id. at 1797.
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preme Court has found to be a minimum constitutional requirement
for libel suits brought by public officials or figures. The explora-
tion of the actual malice doctrine is necessary because the Court's
logic for requiring actual malice protection is, at times, analogous
to situations in which libel plaintiffs have been defamed by bulletin
board speech. Finally, this section summarizes the few prior and
current libel suits that have been initiated against individual bulletin
board users, litigation that has yet to yield a judicial decision.
Part I of this Note draws a comparison between individuals
defamed by computer bulletin board speech and defamation of
public officials and figures via more traditional media. This section
concludes that libel plaintiffs who have been defamed by bulletin
board speech and who have both access to the bulletin board on
which the defamatory material appeared and a history of participat-
ing on the bulletin board are functionally equivalent7 to public
figures.
Libel plaintiffs who have the ability to reply to a defamatory
statement on the bulletin board resemble public figures in that they
have access to the means of counterspeech. In addition, those
plaintiffs who have previously participated in discussions on the
bulletin board on which the defamatory message appeared resemble
public figures because they have thrust themselves into a situation
where they invite public scrutiny. In addition to these similarities,
there is a significant risk that protected speech on computer bulle-
tin boards would be "chilled" by a low-fault or no-fault standard.
As a result, so long as computer bulletin board speech involves a
matter of public concern, this Note asserts that the First Amend-
ment requires plaintiffs in such cases to prove that the defendant
acted with actual malice to recover damages.
This section also asserts that libel plaintiffs with access to a
bulletin board system enjoy an ability to respond that is far superi-
or to the ability of public officials or figures to respond through
the more traditional media. As a consequence, libel plaintiffs who
have access to a bulletin board, but who have not participated in
7. Functional equivalency is defined as the process courts use to analogize new tech-
nologies to more traditional ones, thus adapting existing precedent and standards to new
technology. Edward V. Di Lello, Functional Equivalency and Its Application to Freedom
of Speech on Computer Bulletin Boards, 26 CoLuM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 199, 212-15
(1993). The term is used in a similar manner in this Note to analogize persons who have
access to the computer bulletin board on which they were defamed with public figures
who have the ability to respond to defamatory statements in the traditional media.
237
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the bulletin board's discussions, still should be required to prove
actual malice to recover damages in a libel suit arising from a
defamatory statement on the bulletin board. This section argues that
such a standard is justified even though the plaintiffs' lack of
participation has not exposed them to an increased risk of scrutiny.
Finally, this section acknowledges that the analogy between
cyberlibel plaintiffs and public figures breaks down when the plain-
tiff has no reasonably available means to post a reply. Thus, for
such plaintiffs, some lesser standard, such as that for libel plaintiffs
who are private figures in more traditional media, is allowable
under the First Amendment.8
II. BACKGROUND
A. Computer Bulletin Boards
1. Computer Bulletin Boards-Uses and Technology
A computer bulletin board (sometimes referred to as an elec-
tronic bulletin board) is exactly what the name implies-a com-
puterized version of a cork and pin board on which users can post,
read, and respond to messages.9 A bulletin board system, or BBS,
is a compilation of individual bulletin boards, and is normally
grouped by topic.'0 A bulletin board system is created and main-
tained by a "sysop,"" who obtains the necessary hardware, soft-
ware, and telephone lines to operate the system. Although it gener-
ally costs $1,000 or more to obtain such resources, a basic BBS
8. This Note does not, however, purport to change the established rule for those libel
plaintiffs who are deemed to be public figures by a traditional media-oriented analysis.
Even if public figures in libel suits have been defamed by bulletin board speech and have
no practical means to post a reply, they still must prove actual malice. Such a position is
dictated by precedent that establishes the actual malice doctrine. See infra notes 78-133
and accompanying text (summarizing the development and rationale of the actual malice
doctrine).
9. See David J. Loundy, E-Law: Legal Issues Affecting Computer Information Systems
and Systems Operator Liability, 3 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 79, 82 (1993) (describing com-
puter bulletin board systems as "the computerized equivalent to the bulletin boards com-
monly found in the workplace, schools and the like").
10. ERiC S. RAYMOND, THE NEW HACKER'S DICTIONARY 56 (2d ed. 1993).
11. This term is shorthand for "systems operator." Judith Berck, It's No Longer Just
Techno-Hobbyists Who Meet by Modem, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1992, at 12F. Sysops estab-
lish bulletin board systems for a variety of reasons, including for fun, for profit, and as a
service to employees and customers. Bob Metcalfe, How Many Sysops Will Show Up for
BBSCon-and Just What Is a Sysop?, INFOWORLD, Jan. 30, 1995, at 49, 49.
[Vol. 46:235
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can be established for as little as a few hundred dollars. 12 The
software necessary to start a bulletin board system is widely avail-
able commercially. 3
Communicating on a BBS is even easier than creating one.
Anyone with a computer, a modem, 4 a telephone, and communi-
cations software can log in to, or access, a BBS. 5 Access to other
types of bulletin boards, such as Internet-supported bulletin
boards 6 and commercial on-line services," is only slightly more
complex. This added complexity is due to the special skills and
additional software required to navigate the Internet 8 and com-
mercial on-line services' requirement that users subscribe in ad-
vance. 9 Once logged in to a BBS, the person may choose to post
original messages on the bulletin board, respond to messages al-
ready posted, or simply read the discussions without posting any of
his or her own messages-a practice commonly referred to as
"lurking."920
Computer bulletin boards are rapidly becoming the forum in
which society conducts its debates on a variety of matters. With
approximately seventeen million people spouting their views
through this technology,2' the topics discussed on bulletin boards
12. Loftus E. Becker, Jr., The Liability of Computer Bulletin Board Operators for
Defamation Posted by Others, 22 CoNN. L. REv. 203, 207 (1989).
13. Cutrera, supra note 6, at 556.
14. A modem is a device that sends digital information over analog telephone lines.
The word "modem" is derived from the terms "MODulation/DEModulation" and reflects
the process by which digital information is converted to analog form and vice-versa. Mo-
dems may be installed internally within the computer or can be purchased as a separate
external device. Paul Taylor, Perspectives: Internet's Surf Ciiy--ere We Come, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 10, 1994, at 1. Modems are commonly rated by their "baud rate" or "bits
per second" (bps). These terms reveal how fast modems can exchange data over telephone
lines. Id.
15. Berck, supra note 11, at 12F.
16. See infra notes 48-71 and accompanying text (describing the Internet and the types
of bulletin boards available through it).
17. See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text (describing commercial on-line servic-
es).
18. See generally Katie Hafner, Making Sense of the Internet, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 24,
1994, at 46 (explaining the often confusing methods of gaining access to the Internet).
19. Becker, supra note 12, at 209.
20. RAYMOND, supra note 10, at 265. Indications are that lurkers are the "silent ma-
jority" of bulletin board users. Id.; Laurie Flynn, Lurking On-Line: The Electronic Eaves-
droppers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1995, at C18.
21. In 1994, experts estimated that 17 million people regularly called bulletin boards.
Bob Metcalfe, Sysops Are Reaping the Benefits in the Wake of a BBS Explosion,
INFOWORLD, Sept. 5, 1994, at 52, 52. That number represents a 70% increase over just
two years earlier. Berck, supra note 11, at 12F.
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are as numerous and varied as the bulletin board systems them-
selves. Subjects of bulletin board discussions range from politics22
to musings on the latest episode of television's "The X Files,"
and from Elvis sightings24 to sex. 5 Bulletin boards have become
a popular forum for businesses to coordinate communications and
advertise products,' for doctors to communicate medical informa-
tion,27 and for people with nothing better to do, to gossip.'
No matter what the topic of discussion is, computer bulletin
board users generally consider their medium one in which users
communicate freely and openly. The preferred method of replying
to a disagreeable bulletin board message is not to seek legal sanc-
tions, but rather to "flame" the author of the message.29 While
such reprisals are a well-recognized feature of computer bulletin
boards," BBS users largely regard their domain as off-limits to
22. For example, many federal elected officials are wired to their constituents through
the Internet, other computer bulletin boards, and commercial on-line services. Lawrence J.
Magid, D.C. Gets On-Line with the Public, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1994, at D4.
23. Linda Shrieves, The X-Files; Fox's Cult Favorite Edges Toward Mainstream Popu-
larity, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 14, 1994, at El.
24. See Karen Thomas, On-line gossip: alt.have.you.heard.the.latest?, USA TODAY, July
15, 1994, at 2D (listing several Internet bulletin boards with unusual topics, including
"al t.el vis.sighting," "alt.barney.dinosaur.die.die.die," and
"alt.fan.tonyaharding.whack.whack.whack").
25. See, e.g., Cutrera, supra note 6, at 1 n.6 (stating that adult bulletin boards "are
among the fastest growing components of the BBS market"); Berck, supra note 11, at 12
(describing "adult only" bulletin boards on which users can view nude images, arrange
dates with other users, and have uncensored discussions); Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Battle for
the Soul of the Internet, TIME, July 25, 1994, at 50, 54 (detailing the plethora of pornog-
raphy available on the Intemet).
26. See Nicholas Baran, Businesses Turn to BBSes, BYTE, Sept. 1994, at 32 (stating
that BBSs have become a popular way to handle external communications and provide a
central information system for field offices); Casey Corr, Ads-
New.Internet.Now-Companies in Search of New Profits Are Jumping on the Internet to
Advertise Their Wares, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 11, 1994, at F1 (stating that thousands of
business owners nationwide are advertising on the Internet); Larry M. Edwards,
Cyberspace Business is Booming on the Internet, SAN DiEGo Bus. J., Sept. 12,. 1994,
§ 1, at 1 (describing the efforts of San Diego area businesses that profit from advertising
on computer bulletin boards).
27. See Alana Kainz, Surf s Up!; The World Goes On-Line: A Communication Revolu-
tion, THE OTtAWA CITIZEN, Nov. 9, 1994, at E3 (stating that doctors utilize computer
networks to exchange X-rays).
28. Thomas, supra note 24, at 2D.
29. A flame is a bulletin board message "intended to insult and provoke" and is "di-
rected with hostility at a particular person or people." RAYMOND, supra note 10, at 181.
30. Computer bulletin board users' lack of manners when responding to statements they
disagree with is well-documented. See, e.g., Jennifer Bojorquez, The Miss Manners of
Cyberspace "Netiquette," SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 26, 1994, at B5 (describing the efforts
[Vol. 46:235
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legal sanctions.3' This freedom, of course, is not without a price
and has its limits. In a well-publicized recent example, a University
of Michigan student was accused of posting three sexual fantasies
on the Internet depicting the kidnapping, sodomy, and mutilation of
a fictional victim, to whom he had given the name of a real fe-
male student in one of his classes.32 For this, the student faced
possible expulsion and federal criminal charges of sending threats
over state lines.33 Although incidents of such legal intervention are
increasing, this is still the exception rather than the rule in
cyberspace.34
Part of the "frontier" mentality of BBS communication may be
tied to the anonymity that users enjoy. Most computer bulletin
board systems allow users to participate using pseudonyms or mod-
ifications of their names rather than their full real names. Even if
full names are used, other users are unaware of the physical ap-
pearance, address, or telephone number of the person posting a
message." The fact that bulletin boards have been relatively free
from censorship also certainly contributes to the frontier attitude.36
What little censoring of bulletin board speech that occurs has come
from "moderated" bulletin boards, where the sysop screens messag-
es prior to posting to ensure their suitability.37 Whatever the rea-
of one woman who wrote a book chastising such inappropriate behavior on-line as posting
flames in all capital letters-the computerized equivalent of shouting); Brent Staples,
Beastly Manners in Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1994, at A26.
31. See Barnes, supra note 4, at 22 (stating that the regulation-free nature of communi-
cation on the Internet has led to it being trumpeted as a "true democracy"); Rosalind
Resnick, Cybertort: The New Era, NAT'L LJ., July 18, 1994, at Al (stating that on the
Internet, people who are harshly criticized respond with criticism rather than legal action);
Marc Silver, Action on the Boards, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 18, 1991, at 96, 96
(stating that computer bulletin boards "encourage free speech").
32. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Snuff Porn on the Net, TIME, Feb. 20, 1995, at 69, 69.
33. Id.
34. See Rex S. Heinke & Heather D. Rafter, Rough Justice in Cyberspace: Liability on
the Electronic Frontier, COMPUTER LAW., July 1994, at 1 (stating that BBSs are unique
in their lack of government regulation); Peter Pringle, Censor War Looms Over Invasion
of Cyberspace, THE INDEPENDENT, July 4, 1994, at 10 (quoting cyberspace journalist
Brock Meeks as saying that legislation of computer bulletin boards is not likely to occur
soon because "most [congress members] have never heard of the term 'cyberspace").
35. Cutrera, supra note 6, at 557.
36. See generally Felicity Barringer, Electronic Bulletin BoardsNeed Editing. No They
Don't., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1990, § 4, at 4. (discussing a few instances of limited
censorship and resulting concerns about the impact on free speech).
37. There are indications, especially in the case of major commercial on-line services,
that some sysops are poised to take more active roles in censoring discussion on com-
puter bulletin boards. See Peter H. Lewis, No More "Anything Goes": Cyberspace Gets
Censors, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1994, at Al (detailing several recent incidents of such
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son, up to this point, computer bulletin board users have managed
to keep their medium largely an open forum for communication.
2. Types of Bulletin Board Systems (BBSs)
This Note attempts to define the First Amendment limits for
defamatory statements appearing over three types of computer
bulletin board systems-local computer bulletin boards, Internet-
supported bulletin boards such as news groups, and bulletin boards
found on commercial on-line services. For brevity's sake, the terms
"computer bulletin board," "bulletin board," and "BBS" are used
synonymously in this Note to refer to all three types of forums.
a. Local Bulletin Board Systems
The most numerous and easiest to access BBS is a local bul-
letin board system. Local bulletin boards have existed since 1978
and have experienced tremendous growth since that time.3" As of
1992, the United States alone had approximately "60,000 public
and commercial [bulletin board systems], [and] 120,000 private and
corporate BBSs."'39 Worldwide, an additional 100,000 local bulle-
tin board systems are in existence.'
Local BBSs were invented and cultivated by hobbyists, who
continue to operate most such systems at their own expense.'
While many of these sysops do charge some fee, it is usually a
nominal one.42 More than eighty percent of local computer bulle-
tin board systems are nonprofit.43 However, with the average bul-
letin board having 600 to 800 regular callers, and with those that
do charge averaging annual fees from $45 to $75, local BBS usage
has become a $2 billion industry.'
Local bulletin boards have remained popular despite the emer-
gence of the Internet and commercial on-line services because they
are easier to access. Access to a bulletin board is gained simply by
dialing up the bulletin board's telephone number' with a modem.
censorship). However, most BBSs currently provide little or no control over the content of
their postings. Heinke & Rafter, supra note 34, at 1.
38. Metcalfe, supra note 21, at 52.
39. Schlachter, supra note 1, at 91 (quoting Berck, supra note 11, at 12F).
40. Heinke & Rafter, supra note 34, at 1.
41. Hiawatha Bray, Into Cyberspace via Bulletin Boards, THE RECORD, Jan. 17, 1995,
at D04.
42. Id.
43. Berck, supra note 11, at 12F.
44. Metcalfe, supra note 21, at 52.
45. These telephone numbers are widely available in computer magazines, on the
[Vol. 46:235
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Once this connection is established, the user is able to access the
BBS through the sysop's central computer. Many bulletin boards,
perhaps sensing a demand by users for more wide-spread access,
have begun to provide Internet access to their users,' and some
have joined together to form their own network, a sort of "mini-
Internet."'
b. Internet-Supported Bulletin Boards
The massive international computer network known as the
Internet (or simply the "Net") is becoming a major route by which
users gain access to bulletin boards and other types of information
resources.' The Internet is the world's largest computer network,
combining "campus, state, regional, and national networks ... into
one single logical network all sharing a common addressing
scheme."'49 The Internet is not a single entity, but rather a group
of networks that are organized and paid for separately by partici-
pating organizations such as universities, research labs, and com-
mercial companies.50 With the help of a backbone network main-
tained by the National Science Foundation and commercially oper-
ated communication lines,5" computers in. more than forty nations
worldwide are linked together via the Internet.52 The Internet is
undergoing a period of incredibly rapid expansion, with the number
of people using the Net growing by ten percent each month. 3
Through the Internet, millions of users 4 can communicate
Internet, and through commercial on-line services. Bray, supra note 41, at D04.
46. See Baran, supra note 26, at 32 (discussing increasing demands by business for
multiple BBS services); Dwight Silverman, Digital Nation, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 5,
1995, at Al (quoting a sysop who predicted that to survive, bulletin board systems "will
have to have some kind of Internet connection, without a doubt").
47. Bray, supra note 41, at D04.
48. Brian Livingston, The Mother of All Networks; Internet, PC-COMPUTING, Apr. 1994,
at 180.
49. BRENDAN P. KEHOE, ZEN AND THE ART OF THE INTERNET 86 (Ist ed. 1992).
50. JOSHUA EDDINGS, How THE INTERNET WORKS 13 (1994).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 14-15. People on every continent, including Antarctica, have access to the
Interet. The Internet Show (PBS television broadcast, Mar. 7, 1995).
53. The Internet Show, supra note 52.
54. The precise number of people who use the Internet is unknown. One recent esti-
mate placed the figure at 10 million people, with a projected increase to 100 million by
the year 2000. KEvIN M. SAVETZ, YOUR INTERNET CONSULTANT 9 (1994). The same
study also estimated that somewhat more than 10 million people have access to e-mall
over the Interet. Id. A slightly more recent source estimates that one million computers
and 20 million people have access to the Internet. The Internet Show, supra note 52.
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through bulletin boards or electronic mail. Electronic mail, or e-
mail, works much the same as conventional mail-a sender com-
poses a message and sends it to the recipient's electronic ad-
dress.5 Through the Internet, e-mail can be transmitted almost
instantaneously to computers throughout the world. 6
The Internet's vast array of bulletin board topics are arranged
by subject in a hierarchical system of "news groups" collectively
known as Usenet. 7 Conceptually, these news groups are simply
topical collections of e-mail messages submitted by Internet us-
ers.58 As of late 1993, the Usenet consisted of about 120,000
sites, representing more than 4.2 million participants.5 9 Among the
most popular news groups are those devoted to news reports, sex,
and humor?6
Like other types of bulletin boards, Usenet news groups may
be moderated or unmoderated, with the former category having a
moderator who screens incoming e-mail for suitability before plac-
ing it on the news group.6 Censorship, however, is still quite
rare.
62
In 1991, the incredible communication power of the Usenet
was dramatically illustrated during the attempted coup in the Soviet
Union. Trying to create the impression that the coup had been
successful, hard-line Communists seized control of traditional forms
of mass media such as television, radio, and newspapers. 3 The
coup leaders, however, forgot about the Russian computer network,
55. RAYMOND, supra note 10, at 162.
56. The Internet Show, supra note 52.
57. One author describes the Usenet this way:
The Usenet is simply the largest, most active, and most varied discussion forum
in the world. Imagine a bulletin board on the wall. Imagine that as people pass
it, they glance at what's there, and if they have something to add, they stick
their note up, too. Now (here's the big leap), imagine that there are thousands
of bulletin boards in this building, and that there are actually tens of thousands
of buildings throughout the world, each with its own identical copy of the
bulletin boards. Got it? That's Usenet.
SAvYz, supra note 54, at 160.
58. EDDINGS, supra note 50, at 117.
59. SAVETZ, supra note 54, at 160.
60. Flynn, supra note 20, at C18 (listing the ten most popular Usenet news groups
and number of people worldwide estimated to read these news groups).
61. Id.
62. See The Internet Show, supra note 52 ("Censorship is not a part of the Internet





Soviet citizens used Relcom to post decrees by Boris Yeltsin
and other information on the Usenet. Usenet participants responded
by providing summaries of Western news accounts of the coup at-
tempt.' This effort eventually provided a "steady stream of infor-
mation" to Russian people, and made it clear that the communist
hard-liners had not yet taken control of the country's govern-
ment.(6
Other components of the Internet relevant to this Note are
Free-Nets. A Free-Net is an "electronic town" which, through the
resources of the Internet, combines e-mail, bulletin boards, news,
and a variety of other services.67 Free-Nets thus replicate the
Internet's resources at a more local level.6 8
The original and most well-known Free-Net is the Cleveland
Free-Net.69 This project, which can be accessed by a local phone
call in Cleveland or elsewhere through the Internet," provides not
only bulletin board and e-mail facilities, but also information such
as weather reports, medical data, and library catalogs. 1
c. Commercial On-line Services
Many people find that the quickest, cheapest, and easiest route
to cyberspace is through a commercial on-line service. 2 These




67. See EDDINGS, supra note 50, at 5 ("This convergence of electronic resources has
all the elements of a town-an electronic town."); KEHOE, supra note 49, at 47 (stating
that Free-Nets "provide multi-user chat, email, Usenet news, and a variety of other things
to keep you occupied for hours on end").
68. See EDDINGS, supra note 50, at 5 ("Free-Nets bring the Internet into our own
backyards.").
69. Id.; KEHOE, supra note 49, at 47.
70. EDDINGS, supra note 50, at 5.
71. Id.
72. Walter S. Mossberg, Best Route to Cyberspace Is via Big Three, SAN DffiGo UN-
ION-TRm., Jan. 24, 1995, at 6.
73. The three most prominent on-line services are America Online, Prodigy, and Comp-
userve. As of this writing, Compuserve is the most popular on-line service, with 1.7 mil-
lion subscribers. Id. Other commercial on-line services of note include GEnie and Delphi.
See EDDINGS, supra note 50, at 109. In addition, software industry giant Microsoft recent-
ly introduced its own on-line service. Jube Shiverm Jr., A Software Sell Microsoft Must
Convince Public of On-Line Joys, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 23, 1995, at D4.
74. As of early 1995, the fees for the "Big Three" services were as follows: America
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users receive a membership kit including a local access telephone
number, a password necessary for logging in, and the appropriate
software.75 Each of the major on-line services provide bulletin
boards, e-mail capability, news reports, and reference materials.
6
The bulletin boards of these commercial on-line services are the
forums that have produced the scant amount of libel litigation
arising from bulletin board speech.'
B. Constitutional Libel Law and the Actual Malice Doctrine
1. Precedent
When newspapers and print journalists are sued for libel, the
Supreme Court requires courts to conduct a "definitional bal-
ancing '  analysis to determine if the speech is protected. Pursuant
to this process, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant acted in
accordance with a particular standard of fault. This standard varies
according to the classification of both the plaintiff and the nature
of the speech involved. The Court requires libel plaintiffs to prove
that the defendant acted with "actual malice" '79 when the speech
Online and Prodigy--S9.95 per month for the first five hours, and $2.95 per hour thereaf-
ter, Compuserve-$4.80 per hour for services at popular modem speeds, and unlimited
access to some common services for a $9.95 monthly fee. Mossberg, supra note 72, at 6.
75. Paul Taylor, Learner Drivers on the Superhighway, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1994, at
3.
76. Mossberg, supra note 72, at 6.
77. See infra notes 134-57 and accompanying text (discussing recent litigation).
78. Definitional balancing is a process by which the Supreme Court determines what
forms of speech are protected as "speech" under the First Amendment. See Melville B.
Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to
Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 942-43 (1968) (setting forth the
definitional balancing theory).
79. Much time and effort has been spent to define exactly what degree of fault the
actual malice standard requires. This effort has yielded only moderate success. As defined
in the Court's opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the actual malice standard re-
quires that the plaintiff prove the defendant's libelous statement was made "with knowl-
edge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). The Court has since sharpened
the second branch of this test by stating that libel plaintiffs can meet the reckless disre-
gard standard only by showing that the libelous statements were made with a "high de-
gree of awareness of their probable falsity." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74
(1964). In the area of joumalism, the Court has refused to hold reporters liable for mere-
ly doing an inadequate job of verifying facts, instead insisting the libel plaintiffs show
that defendants have some hint that the defamatory statements were false prior to publish-
ing them. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) ("There must be suffi-
cient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication."); cf. Harte-Hanks Communications v.
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involves a matter of public concern and the plaintiff is a public
official," an "all-purpose" public figure,8 or has injected himself
or herself into the midst of a particular public controversy, thereby
becoming a "limited purpose" public figure.82 However, the Court
has also ruled that where the plaintiff is a private figure and the
speech is a matter of purely private concern, states may permit
recovery where the plaintiff has shown the defendant acted with
some lower level of fault."
Until 1964, the law of libel was grounded solely in tort law,
which generally allowed the plaintiff a monetary recovery for "an
invasion of the interest in reputation in good name."8" The First
Amendment was thought not to protect libelous speech from gov-
ernment-supported sanctions."
But in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,86 the Court laid the
groundwork for a First Amendment limit on the libel tort. In this
landmark case," the newspaper accepted an advertisement request-
ing help for the Southern civil rights movement. Sullivan, the
Montgomery, Alabama, police commissioner, alleged that two para-
graphs of this advertisement libeled him.8 When Sullivan sued the
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 692 (1989) (upholding a libel award against a newspaper that
reported that a municipal judge's clerk had used improper tactics in his campaign because
the newspaper made a "deliberate decision not to acquire knowledge" that would likely
have shown the stories were false). One way for a libel plaintiff to prove the defendant
acted with actual knowledge that the defamatory statement was false is to show the de-
famatory statements were fabricated. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419
U.S. 245, 252-54 (1974) (finding a reporter who fabricated an interview with a West
Virginia widow acted with actual malice). The New York Times actual malice standard
requires an inquiry into the speaker's state of mind before publishing or writing the libel-
ous statements. See KENT R. MIDDLETON & BILL F. CHAMBERLiN, THE LAW OF PUBLIC
COMMUNICATION 135-36 (2d ed. 1991) (reviewing court cases in which libel plaintiffs
were allowed to require journalists to testify about their state of mind and conversations
with editors during the publication process).
80. E.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
81. E.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162-63 (1967).
82. E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
83. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985).
84. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 771 (5th
ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
85. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (stating that libelous
statements are not within the scope of the First Amendment because they are not an
"essential part of any exposition of ideas").
86. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
87. New York Times is generally regarded as the starting point for all constitutional
libel issues. Alexander Micklejohn referred to the case as "an occasion for dancing in the
streets" after it was released. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on
"The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SuP. Cr. REV. 191, 221 n.125.
88. The Court quoted the advertisement in question:
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newspaper for libel, he prevailed in the state courts, which found
that the advertisement was "of and concerning" Sullivan and thus
defamatory per se under the state's civil libel law. 9 The U.S. Su-
preme Court, however, rejected the prevailing view that libel law is
merely a matter of state tort law' and held that the state's com-
mon law rule, which allowed Sullivan to recover simply upon
showing the advertisement was "of and concerning" him, violated
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.9
In so doing, the Court held that "the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" ren-
dered Alabama's common law of libel constitutionally invalid.'
The Court was concerned that while false statements are not pro-
tected by the First Amendment,93 some truthful speech could be
chilled in a country devoted to encouraging free and open debate
where mistakes are inevitable.94 Requiring libel plaintiffs to prove
actual malice, the Court stated, more adequately protects against
"In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang 'My Country, 'Tis of
Thee' on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from school, and
truckloads of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State
College Campus. When the entire student body protested to state authority by
refusing to re-register, their dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve
them into submission.
Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King's
peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his home
almost killing his wife and child. They have assaulted his person. They have
arrested him seven times-for 'speeding,' 'loitering' and similar 'offenses.' And
now they have charged him with 'perjury'-a felony under which they could
imprison him for ten years .... "
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 257-58 (emphasis in original).
89. Id. at 262-64.
90. See W. WAT HOPKINS, AcTUAL MALICE 2 (1989) ("The case was revolutionary
because, for the first time, the Supreme Court entered an arena that had previously been
reserved to the states-civil libel law.").
91. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 292.
92. Id. at 270.
93. The Court raised the possibility that false statements of fact do have First Amend-
ment value in footnote 19 of its opinion. The Court quoted John Stuart Mill who said
that such statements bring about "the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth,
produced by its collision with error." Id. at 279 n.19 (quoting JoHN STEWART MILL, ON
LIBERTY 15 (1947)). However, the remainder of the Court's opinion apparently assumes
that only truthful statements of fact have First Amendment value, granting false statements
of fact protection only because of the risk that truthful speech would be chilled by the
state's common law libel rule.
94. Id.
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this chilling effect than a lesser-fault or no-fault standard.95
The Court also held the actual malice standard i§ constitution-
ally required for libel suits by public figures in the combined case
of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walk-
er.' While the central meaning of New York Times is often stated
as holding that seditious libel is incompatible with the First
Amendment,97 Butts recognized that the public interest in the cir-
culation of materials concerning those people who are of general
public interest, such as Butts98 and Walker," is similar to the in-
terest in news reports about public officials."o It further reasoned
that since public figures have thrust themselves into the center of
an important public controversy, and can respond to defamatory
speech arising out of that controversy through the mass media, the
actual malice standard strikes the best balance between the media's
First Amendment interest and the plaintiff's interest in his or her
reputation."°'
The actual malice doctrine was extended even further in Ros-
enbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.."°e In Rosenbloom, a plurality of the
Court extended New York Times's actual malice protection to all
speech concerning any libel plaintiff involved in a matter of public
95. Id. at 279-80.
96. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
97. In sum, this view of New York Times is that the framers of the Bill of Rights
sought to abolish seditious libel by enacting the First Amendment, and thus the harm to a
government official's reputation is insufficient to overcome the First Amendment's basic
guarantee of freedom of speech. Therefore, government officials seeking a redress for libel
must show a high level of fault by the plaintiff to recover damages. Kalven, supra note
87, at 204-10. Whether the framers actually intended to prohibit seditious libel via the
First Amendment is a matter of dispute. Compare ZACHARIAH CHAFFE, JR., FREE SPEECH
IN THE UNrrED STATES 18-30 (1941) (asserting that one of the principal reasons behind
the First Amendment was to reject seditious libel) with LEONARD LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A
FREE PRESS 220-81 (1985) (asserting that the framers did not intend to reject seditious
libel).
98. Butts was the athletic director of the University of Georgia when the Saturday
Evening Post published an article accusing him of conspiring to "fix" a football game
between his school and the University of Alabama. Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at 135.
99. Walker was a former Army officer who had commanded federal troops during a
1957 school segregation confrontation at Little Rock, Arkansas. A wire story from the
Associated Press stated that during a 1962 university riot Walker, encouraged rioters to
use violence and gave rioters technical advice on combating the effects of tear gas. Id. at
140. Following his retirement from the military, Walker gained notoriety by giving several
speeches opposing federal intervention. The Court, noting that Walker had his own follow-
ing, stated that he "could fairly be deemed a man of some political prominence." Id.
100. Id. at 154.
101. Id. at 155.
102. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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concern, regardless of whether the plaintiff would otherwise qualify
as a public figure or official. 3 The plurality paid homage to
New York Times's "commitment to robust debate on public issues,
which is embodied in the First Amendment,"'' " and reasoned that
the public's interest in information regarding public events is no
less significant than in situations involving public officials or fig-
ures. 5 Thus, the Court concluded that the public's interest in
such events demands that the protection of the actual malice stand-
ard be extended to cover speech in this area." 6
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., ' 7 the Court rejected the posi-
tion that all speech or matters of public concern should be subject
to the actual malice standard. The plaintiff in Gertz was an attor-
ney who had represented the family of a teenage boy who had
been shot and killed by a police officer. In response to Gertz's
representation, a magazine published an article accusing Gertz of
being a "Communist-fronter" and a "Leninist."' '  When Gertz
sued the magazine for defamation, the magazine's publisher at-
tempted to defend the suit based on the Rosenbloom standard,
asserting that the subject matter of the article was of a public
concern." A divided Court, however, refused to apply the actual
malice standard to publication of all matters of public interest.
Rather, the Court held that private persons defamed from speech
concerning public issues should receive more protection of their
reputations than the actual malice standard provides."0
Gertz is significant not only for limiting the applicability of
the actual malice standard, but for providing the rationale behind
the standard. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, stated that pub-
lic figures differ from private individuals in two ways. First, public
figures ordinarily have access to "channels of effective communi-
cation" that allow them to respond to false statements about
them."' Second, they "invite attention and comment" of the pub-
lic by seeking a prominent role in society." 2 Thus, although pub-
103. Id. at 43-44.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 43.
106. Id.
107. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
108. Id. at 325-26.
109. Id. at 330-32.
110. Id. at 345.
111. Id. at 344.
112. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
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lic figures run an increased risk of being the subject of libelous
statements, they also have the means to address them. Private per-
sons, however, are more vulnerable to injury because they have
few opportunities to contradict libelous statements through the mass
media. A private individual also gives up "no part of his interest in
the protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a
more compelling call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted
by defamatory falsehood."".
Justice Powell also did not cut off all vestiges of the actual
malice standard for persons such as Gertz, whose position in soci-
ety does not justify labeling them all-purpose public figures." 4
Libel plaintiffs who are not all-purpose public figures must still
prove New York Times actual malice if they are "limited," or "vor-
tex" public figures." 5 Such limited public figures, the Court held,
must prove the defendant acted with actual malice if the defama-
tion arose out of a public controversy in which the plaintiff volun-
tarily injected himself or herself.' 6 However, where the plaintiff
is merely a private figure, the Court determined that states may de-
fine their own standards of liability so long as the standard is not
no-fault liability.1 7 The Court ruled that Gertz was neither an all-
purpose nor a limited public figure, and remanded the case."8
Eleven years later constitutional libel law took another turn in
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc..' The Court
in Dun & Bradstreet stated that when a false defamatory statement
about a private person does not involve a "matter of public con-
cern," a plaintiff may collect presumed and punitive damages with-
out having to prove any level of fault.'" Justice Powell, again
writing for the Court, reasoned that where the content of the de-
famatory message is of concern only to the parties involved, no
threat to the free expression of public issues can be presented by a
113. Id.
114. The Court defined such all-purpose public figures as those people who "achieve
such pervasive fame or notoriety that [they become] a public figure for all purposes and
in all contexts." Id. at 351.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. The Court did rule, however, that states must require pri-
vate plaintiffs to prove actual malice to recover punitive damages. Id. at 349.
118. Id. at 352. Gertz eventually won his libel suit more than 14 years after filing it.
MIDDLETON & CHAMBERLIN, supra note 79, at 120.
119. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
120. Id. at 763.
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less stringent libel standard than actual malice.12'
2. The Two-Pronged Analysis and the Two Theories of the
Second Prong
The result of the Court's decisions is a two-pronged analysis
to determine whether the actual malice standard is required by the
First Amendment. Courts must examine (1) the nature of the
speech involved and (2) the public or private nature of the plain-
tiff. Only where both prongs reveal a distinctly public charac-
ter-the speech is of a matter of public concern and the plaintiff is
a public figure-is the actual malice standard considered constitu-
tionally compelled."
Through the operation of the second prong,"n the actual mal-
ice doctrine has evolved beyond a safeguard against seditious libel.
The doctrine now affords greater First Amendment protection to
libel directed at public officials or figures on matters of public
concern for two main reasons. First, such plaintiffs have a greater
ability to respond to libelous statements. As such, they have less
need for the protection that libel law affords. Second, public offi-
cials and figures have actively sought the public's attention. Having
done so, they must accept the risk of defamation that comes with
notoriety, since our society is willing to accept some amount of
false speech to guard against protected, truthful speech being
chilled. Thus, public officials and figures, who have both access to
the means of counterspeech and a history of thrusting themselves
into the public spotlight, must prove at least that the defendant
acted with actual malice in order to recover damages. Private indi-
viduals, however, are not constitutionally required to prove actual
malice, because they "are both more vulnerable to injury and more
121. Id. at 749.
122. See, e.g., Stacey L. Hayden, Note, Limited-Purpose Public Figures: Spence v. Flynt
as an Illustration of the Need for a More Complete Test, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 827, 830;
Linda Kalm, Note, The Burden of Proving Truth or Falsity in Defamation: Setting a
Standard for Cases Involving Nonmedia Defendants, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 812, 826 (1992)
(describing the rule in the aftermath of this line of cases as a dual inquiry into the nature
of the plaintiff and topic).
123. Because of the Court's decision in Dun & Bradstreet, see supra notes 119-21 and
accompanying text, the thesis of this Note does not extend beyond bulletin board speech
that involves speech on matters of public interest. The Court in Dun & Bradstreet deter-
mined that in libel suits involving speech on matters of a purely private nature, an insig-
nificant threat is posed to public debates. Thus, the First Amendment does not demand
that states require any fault be shown. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,




In formulating the actual malice doctrine, the theory that pub-
lic plaintiffs have a greater ability to respond is clearly rooted in
the predominant theory of First Amendment protection-the "mar-
ketplace of ideas." For nearly eighty years, the theory has posited
that in a free and open exchange, truth will naturally prevail over
falsity."as The marketplace theory has often supported highly
speech-protective decisions by the Court.'26 This is because the
marketplace theory is premised on the belief that by allowing ideas
to be freely traded without government-imposed punishment distort-
ing the process, the truth will win out.
Even proponents of this theory, however, have accepted that
some restriction on expression is necessary to compensate for mar-
ketplace flaws in the trade of ideas. The actual malice standard,
through its focus on the ability of the plaintiff to respond through
counterspeech, reflects this marketplace theory.
Libel law, however, is also a compromise between society's
interest in maintaining free and open debate and the libel plaintiff's
interest in his or her good name.' This balancing is reflected in
124. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMEIuCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-13, at 877 (2d ed.
1988).
125. The marketplace concept was first espoused by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), who stated
that the "ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the mar-
ket."
126. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (prohibiting a well-
known evangelist from recovering damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress
from a magazine parody of him in part because of the "fundamental importance of the
free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern"); Philadelphia
Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777-78 (1986) (holding that a private figure plaintiff
in a libel suit had the burden of proving falsity of the newspaper defendant's assertions
on a matter of public concern in part because of the need to encourage free trade in
ideas).
127. A prime example of marketplace flaws cited as a reason for prohibitions on speech
occurred in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), in which the Court upheld the
conviction of a person who published and distributed the Communist Manifesto in viola-
tion of an anti-anarchy statute. Justice Holmes, dissenting, stated that speech generally
should be expressed without government interference. Id. at 672. He allowed, however,
that if some irrevocable harm would occur before counterspeech could remedy the original
speech (a "clear and present danger"), suppression may be necessary and constitutional. Id.
at 672-73.
128. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 84, § 111, at 771 ("[D]efamation is an inva-
sion of the interest in reputation and good name."); BRUCE W. SANFORD, Lir.. AND
PRIVACY § 4.1, at 95 (2d ed. 1993) ("In the beginning, there is injury to reputation:
words or pictures that may diminish a person's good name. Since medieval England, the
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what is termed here as the "assumption of the risk" aspect of the
second prong. This theory is best exemplified in the Gertz deci-
sion. 9 Gertz recognized that just as public officials "must accept
certain necessary consequences of that involvement in public af-
fairs, M30 public figures "have thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution
of the issues involved."'' Thus, "the communications media are
entitled to act on the assumption that public officials and public
figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to an increased risk of
injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them.' 3'  When
purely private plaintiffs are involved, however, "[n]o such assump-
tion is justified.' ' 33
C. Libel Cases in Cyberspace
To date, no court in the United States has decided a case
involving a suit against a computer bulletin board user arising out
of defamatory statements posted on the bulletin board." Three
such cases have arisen, although the parties subsequently settled
their disputes.
law of libel has sought to redress that injury.").
129. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
130. Id. at 344.
131. Id. at 345.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. The Supreme Court of Western Australia, however, has decided a libel case arising
out of a posting on the DIALx science anthropology computer bulletin board. See Rindos
v. Hardwick, No. 940164 (Sup. Ct. W. Austi. Mar. 31, 1994). In this case, an American
anthropologist posted the message criticizing the University of Western Australia for refus-
ing to grant tenure to the plaintiff, a professor at the University, and for dismissing him.
The defendant replied to this posting, and alleged that the plaintiff's academic career "has
been built not on field research at all, but on his ability to berate and bully all and
sundry on the logic of his own evolutionary theories. In the local pub, drinking and chain
smoking all the while for that matter." Id. The plaintiff sued, alleging that along with this
comment, the defendant had posted messages accusing the plaintiff of engaging in sexual
misconduct with a local boy and of being a racist. In a 1994 unreported decision, the
court awarded the plaintiff $40,000 in damages plus interest, making no distinction be-
tween defamation on a computer bulletin board and the more traditional media. Id. Of
course, this case is of limited significance for the purposes of this Note, since Australia




In Suarez Corp. Industries v. Meeks' journalist Brock
Meeks operated a bulletin board called Cyberwire Dispatch.'36
Meeks, now the Washington bureau chief of Inter@ctive Week
magazine and, according to Time magazine, "the best known chron-
icler of the Internet,"'37 posted two messages on his bulletin
board about Suarez Corporation Industries.' In these postings,
Meeks referred to Suarez's electronic advertisements on the Internet
as "questionable marketing scams," and questioned the legitimacy
of Suarez's marketing practices. '39 Suarez responded by suing
Meeks for libel.
In a motion for summary judgment and in various statements
to the media, Meeks argued that Benjamin Suarez should have to
prove actual malice according to the standards set forth in New
York Times."'4 According to this argument, Suarez was a public
figure, not because of his position in society, but because the com-
munication was made on a computer bulletin board. Meeks argued
that Suarez could, therefore, respond to the libel by posting a reply
on the bulletin board rather than suing for libel damages.' B-
efore these issues could be resolved, however, the parties settled,
with Meeks agreeing not to publish any article about the company
or Benjamin Suarez for eighteen months without allowing Suarez a
chance to review the article first. 142
2. Medphone
When Peter DeNigris logged on to Prodigy to share his finan-
cial investment advice with others, he ended up in the middle of
another case with a chance to establish the First Amendment pa-
rameters of computer bulletin boards. DeNigris stated that investing
in Medphone Corp., a small New Jersey company, was unwise
because the "company is really having a difficult time" and "ap-
135. No. 267513 (Ohio Cuyahoga County 1994).
136. Id.
137. Inter@ctive Week Appoints Brock Meeks Washington Bureau Chief; Award-Winning
Journalist is Cyberspace Pioneer, BUS. WImE, Sept. 22, 1994.
138. Suarez Corp. Indus. v. Meeks, No. 267513 (Ohio Cuyahoga County 1994).
139. Id. (consent judgment). Other statements in the posting included calling Benjamin
Suarez a "slick, direct-mail baron:' and accusing Suarez of trying to "pull a P.T. Barnum
routine." Id.
140. Resnick, supra note 31, at A21.
141. Id.
142. Suarez Corp. Indus. v. Meeks, No. 267513 (consent judgment).
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pears to be a fraud.1 43 Medphone responded by suing DeNigris
for libel in federal court, claiming that its stock dropped by fifty
percent as a result of DeNigris's comments.1"
DeNigris did not argue that an actual malice standard should
be applied in this case. Instead, he contended that his messages
were not defamatory at all.'45 Observers of the case asserted that
Prodigy, not individual users, were ultimately responsible for what-
ever libel DeNigris's postings contained, on the theory that Prodigy
had assumed a duty to screen its messages.'" Again, however,
the parties settled the case for a nominal sum before a judge could
determine how far the First Amendment's limits on libel law ex-
tend into cyberspace. 47 Medphone, which had sought up to $40
million in libel damages, agreed to exchange one dollar and settle
the case.'" Although DeNigris claimed victory as a result of the




The most recent libel case arising from bulletin board speech
also involved Prodigy's Money Talk. A Prodigy subscriber posted
a message accusing the Stratton Oakmont investment bank of fraud
in connection with Stratton's initial public stock offering. 5° The
user accused the bank, which had paid a $2.5 million penalty for a
securities law violation earlier that year,' of failing to disclose
that it had lost its biggest customer until after it launched the
offering.'52 The posting read, "This is fraud, fraud, fraud, and
criminal!"' 53 Stratton, instead of posting a reply, filed a $200 mil-
lion libel action against Prodigy and the subscriber initially suspect-
143. Amy Harmon, New Legal Frontier: Cyberspace, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1993, at Al,
A24.
144. Medphone Corp. v. DeNigris, Civil Action No. 92-3785 (D. N.J. 1992).
145. Harmon, supra note 143, at A24. The company also sued DeNigris for securities
fraud. Id. at Al.
146. Id. at A24.
147. Resnick, supra note 31, at A21.
148. Fred Vogelstein, Suit Over Bulletin Board Chatter Over, but Computer Libel Issue
Isn't, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 2, 1994, at 2.
149. Id.
150. Catherine Yang, Flamed with a Lawsuit, Bus. WK., Feb. 6, 1995, at 70, 70.
151. Jerry Knight, Free Speech Collides with Cyberspace, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1994,
at E19.
152. Yang, supra note 150, at 70.
153. Id.
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ed of posting the message, David Lusby. 154
While the Stratton case drew attention for the questions it
raised regarding bulletin board operator liability,5 5 the case also
presented the issue of individual liability, because Stratton sued
Lusby individually. However, Lusby was dropped from the suit
because he convinced Stratton he did not post the message.'56
The court recently granted partial summary judgment for Stratton
on the basis of Prodigy's liability as a bulletin board operator. 7
As a result, the case is significant for its determination of bulletin
board operator liability, not for setting First Amendment limits for
liability of individual bulletin board users.
IMl. ANALYSIS
A. Can Bulletin Board Communication Ever Be Libel?
Before delving into the constitutionally appropriate standard
for libel suits arising from bulletin board speech, it is first neces-
sary to determine whether this speech can be considered libel at
all. This involves the resolution of two separate questions. First,
whether defamatory bulletin board speech is more accurately char-
acterized as libel or slander, second, whether individual users of
bulletin boards, rather than system operators, are the proper target
of libel suits.
154. Id.
155. See Robert Charles, Computer Libel Questions in 'Stratton v. Prodigy,' N.Y. U.,
Dec. 13, 1994, at 1 (raising the question of whether commercial computer bulletin boards
owe a duty to those alleging they were defamed by a bulletin board's subscriber); Knight,
supra note 151, at E26 (exploring the possibility that Prodigy may be held liable for
defamatory postings because it edits its bulletin boards); Stratton Oalanont Lawsuit Against
Prodigy Attempts to Pin Responsibility for Content on Operators, COMPUTERRAM INT'L,
Feb. 10, 1995 [hereinafter Stratton Oalanont Lawsuit] ("At issue in the libel claim is
whether the computer on-line service is viewed as a newspaper, responsible for its editori-
al content, or as a telephone carrier or bookstore, and therefore not responsible for con-
tent.").
156. Id Lusby, a former Prodigy employee, swore under oath that he did not post the
message and that another Prodigy subscriber also named David Lusby denied writing this
message as well. Knight, supra note 151, at E26.
157. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 24, 1995); see also supra note 6 (discussing the applicability of libel law to com-
puter bulletin board systems).
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1. Libel or Slander?
Defamation that occurs over computer bulletin board systems
is best categorized as libel rather than its sibling tort, slander.
While both torts allow recovery for defamation, libel generally
covers written or printed defamation, while slander traditionally
covers oral defamation.'58 The distinction is not an easy one."9
Furthermore, the importance of the distinction extends beyond mere
concerns about the form of the required pleadings. Slander plain-
tiffs usually win smaller damage awards than people suing for
libel."W Slander plaintiffs have traditionally been required to
prove a financial loss as a result of the defamation to recover,
while no analogous requirement exists in state libel law. 6'
While characterizing defamation on computer bulletin boards
as slander would result in more freedom of speech in cyberspace
(because of the provable financial loss requirement), this type of
defamation is better characterized as libel. Slander is more transito-
ry and therefore less harmful than libel.'62 One scholar used this
distinction to posit a hypothetical in which Sam Slammer posts a
bulletin board message accusing Dora Defamed of child abuse, and
asserted that because of the more permanent nature of bulletin
board speech, any defamation action Dora would have against Sam
should be sounded in libel:
Written or printed words are considered more harmful than
spoken words because they are deemed more premeditated
and deliberate. For example, Sam Slammer had to sit down
at a keyboard and compose his post; it is not a matter of a
comment carelessly made in a fit of anger. Printed words
also last longer, because they are put in a form in which
they can serve to remind auditors of the defamation, while
the spoken word is gone once uttered. Had Sam Slammer
158. MIDDLETON & CHAMBERLIN, supra note 79, at 86-87; cf. PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 84, at 786-88 (suggesting that the distinction is more complex and revolves
around whether the speech is embodied "in some more or less permanent physical form").
159. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 cmt. b (1977); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 84, at 786 ("The distinction itself between libel and slander is not free from
difficulty and uncertainty.").
160. MIDDLETON & CHAMBERLIN, supra note 79, at 87.
161. Id. The reason for this distinction is that printed materials have historically been
assumed to cause more harm to a person's reputation than the spoken word. Id. The
Restatement of Torts, however, calls for an end to the libel-slander distinction. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568A (1977).
162. Loundy, supra note 9, at 91.
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accused Dora Defamed of child abuse in person, the state-
ment would be fleeting; on the BBS it is stored for view-
ing by any user who decides to read what posts have been
left in the [BBS]. For days, weeks or months people can
read Sam's Statement unless Samantha Sysop removes
it.... Text on a computer screen shares more traits with
libel than with slander."
In addition, a message posted on a BBS and displayed on a
computer screen can become a printed message at the touch of a
button if the user prints the message to an attached printer."6
Therefore, because it takes more time to type out a bulletin board
message than to speak, and because such a message is more per-
manent than a sppken one, postings on bulletin boards more close-
ly resemble written than spoken communication. Any liability for
bulletin board defamation should thus come from libel rather than
slander law.
2. The Proper Target for Cyberspace Libel Suits
Having decided for what cyberlibel plaintiffs may sue, the next
question to answer is whom they may sue. The proper targets for
libel suits are generally the individuals who post defamatory mes-
sages rather than the bulletin board operators who allow the mes-
sages to be posted.
The question of whether sysops of bulletin boards may be held
liable for libelous messages posted on their fora" 5 turns on what
form of traditional media computer bulletin boards resemble. Cub-
by, Inc. v. Compuserve,'" a 1991 District Court decision, con-
cluded that bulletin board operators are mere distributors of infor-
mation, much like a bookstore, and thus cannot be liable for defa-
mation unless they knew or should have known of the defamatory
163. Id. (footnote omitted); cf. SANFORD, supra note 128, at 47 (determining whether
computer information systems in general are governed by the law of libel or slander is
not a simple task because "the range and combination of variables available in electronic
systems make it difficult to generalize about whether they are more like speakers or writ-
ers.").
164. Loundy, supra note 9, at 91.
165. Libel plaintiffs will presumably wish to sue sysops rather than individual BBS
users because sysops may haver greater resources. See T.R. Reid, The New Legal Fron-
tier: Laying Down the Law in Cyberspace, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1994, at F24 (noting
the defamed person "is apt to sue the big, rich company that operates the BBS system
[sic].").
166. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). For a brief summary of this case, see supra
note 6.
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nature of the message. 67 The Cubby decision has been widely
praised" and may well represent the position most other courts
will take.169 Moreover, the latest draft of the Uniform Defamation
Act provides that computer bulletin board operators generally are
not to be subject to liability as "republishers" of information. 7
Thus, it appears that individual BBS users are the proper target for
libel suits arising from bulletin board speech.
B. Factors in the BBS Public Figure Determination
Given, then, that communication on computer bulletin boards is
best characterized as libel generally actionable against the party
who posts the defamatory message, it remains to define constitu-
tional standards by which states may hold parties liable.' Based
167. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140.
168. See, e.g., Cutrera, supra note 6, at 581 (expressing hope that future courts will
follow the Cubby decision); Connor, supra note 6, at 236 (stating that given the factual
scenarios in Cubby, the decision was "sound"); Charles, supra note 6, at 40 (stating that
the case erects "a sturdy fence around this sapling industry"). But cf Anthony J. Sassan,
Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc.: Comparing Apples to Oranges: The Need for a New
Media Classification, 5 SoFTWARE LJ. 821, 843-44 (1992) ("Although correct, the deci-
sion in Cubby failed to provide courts with an adequate method for applying defamation
law to new media technology, the [information system company]. . . . mhe court should
have created a new media classification for Compuserve and other [information system
companies].") (footnote omitted).
169. See Stem v. Delphi Interet Servs. Corp., 626 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (hold-
ing that Delphi, in providing access to its computerized database service, was a "news
disseminator" rather than a publisher). But see Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs.
Co., 23 Media L. Rep. 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (holding that Prodigy was the publish-
er of allegedly libelous statements on one of its bulletin boards because it exercised edito-
rial control over its BBSs).
170. UNIF. DEFAMATION Acr § 21 (1992 draft not approved by the National Conference
of Uniform Commissioners). The Act states that a technology such as computer bulletin
boards is not subject to liability for republishing if it "(1) is not reasonably understood to
assert in the normal course of its business the truthfulness of the information maintained
or transmitted; or (2) takes reasonable steps to inform users that it does not assert the
truthfulness of the information maintained or transmitted." Id.
171. Because libel law is a creature of both state law and constitutional interpretation,
two options exist for how the actual malice standard advocated by this Note may be
adopted for cyberlibel plaintiffs. First, the courts could mandate such a constitutional
standard when a factually appropriate case is brought before them. Second, because libel
law is also a product of state common and statutory law, states could codify an actual
malice requirement in their libel laws because it represents not only First Amendment
limits, but sound policy as well. However, the first option, a ruling by a court-ideally
the Supreme Court-is the most desirable. This option would have the advantage of grant-
ing constitutional rather than mere statutory protection to bulletin board users. In addition,
difficult choice-of-law problems would arise if all states did not enact the same level of
protection for bulletin board participants. Having various levels of libel protection across
different states is particularly unpalatable in the case of cyberspace, which makes state
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on the Supreme Court's reasoning in developing the actual malice
doctrine, the determination of whether the First Amendment
requires application of the actual malice standard to defamatory
bulletin board speech on matters of public concern should depend
on several factors. These factors are (1) whether the plaintiff has
access to the bulletin board on which the defamatory message
appeared, (2) to what extent the plaintiff has previously participated
on the bulletin board, and (3) the likelihood that truthful, protected
speech in this medium would be chilled by a less stringent stand-
ard.
172
1. Access to the Bulletin Board-The Reply Rationale
The primary thrust behind a court's determination of whether
the actual malice standard should extend to cyberlibel should be
how closely the bulletin board in question resembles a true "mar-
ketplace of ideas." In other words, the question should be whether
the libel plaintiff could respond on the bulletin board. A libel
plaintiff who can post counterspeech on the bulletin board where
the defamatory statement appeared is thereby analogous to a public
official or figure. Thus the actual malice standard should be consti-
tutionally required for that plaintiff to recover damages."
A plaintiff who has the proper computer, modem, and software,
and who can dial a bulletin board number without having to pay a
substantial fee, has "access' 74 to a bulletin board. In contrast, a
boundaries nearly obsolete. Thus, a judicial ruling is the preferable means to translate this
Note's thesis into law.
172. This analysis presupposes that libel suits against individuals raise the same types of
issues and require the same First Amendment protections as suits against media entities.
This assumption has certainly not been settled and was explicitly passed over by the Su-
preme Court. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greemoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985); Jeff Boykin, Note, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.: Does the
Actual Malice Standard of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. Apply to Speech on Matters of
Purely Private Concern?, 14 PEPP. L. REV. 337, 337-40 (1987).
173. A recently published book echoes this position, observing that while private citizens
have been able to recover libel damages without having to prove actual malice, partly
because they do not have the means of access to mass media, this is not the case in
cyberspace. EDwARD A. CAVAZOS & GAVINO MORIN, CYBERSPACE AND THE LAW 80
(1994) ("Interestingly, this is no longer the case with cyberspace, where everyone has a
similar ability to communicate with large numbers of people.").
174. Courts use the term "access" to refer to the determination of whether the plaintiff
has attempted to influence public opinion about an important public controversy, so that
he or she has captured the attention of the public and will have access to the mass me-
dia. Thus, access is a product of the plaintiffs action to thrust himself or herself into the
midst of a public controversy. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974)
("It is preferable to reduce the public-figure question to a more meaningful context by
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person who neither owns nor has access to a computer, who has
never used a computer or has no idea how a computer bulletin
board functions, or who could not reasonably afford the cost to ac-
cess the BBS, has no "access" to counterspeech. Thus, "access," as
used in this Note, turns on the reasonableness of expecting the
plaintiff to be able to respond to a defamatory statement on a
BBS. This determination, in turn, may take into account whether a
libel plaintiff, through his or her history of participation on a BBS,
would be likely to read the defamation soon enough after it is
posted to respond effectively. 7
The access enjoyed by the former category of plaintiffs is not
merely the equivalent of that enjoyed by traditional public figures.
Rather, computer bulletin boards allow a superior form of counter-
speech more perfectly resembling the marketplace of ideas, a type
of access referred to in this Note as "super-access." Those libel
plaintiffs with access to the computer bulletin board on which the
defamatory material appeared have the ability to post a nearly
universal and instantaneous response. This super-access is in sharp
contrast with a public figure who has been defamed in a newspa-
per, for example. That person must go to the trouble of taking an
looking to the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular contro-
versy giving rise to the defamation."). Thus, courts have examined whether a plaintiff has
access to the means of reply by examining his or her role in a public controversy, there-
by providing the public attention to have his or her reply heard.
This Note breaks with that definition of access to some degree. It asserts that libel
plaintiffs who have the ability to respond on the computer bulletin board on which the
defamation appeared have access to the reply means not because they have invited the
public's attention, but simply because they can post a reply on the bulletin board. Thus,
it could be argued that this Note is inconsistent with the public figure precedent in that it
focuses on the libel plaintiffs ability to respond, rather than on the ability of the libel
plaintiff to make people pay attention to his or her response. However, the author does
not believe this is a fatal flaw with this Note's thesis. Communication on computer bulle-
tin boards is more anonymous than in other media; readers usually do not know the
name of the person writing a message and cannot identify the sender by any way other
than a series of letters or numbers or both. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
Thus, all libel plaintiffs responding to bulletin board defamation will have an equal oppor-
tunity to make the public read their responses, because readers do not pay attention to
bulletin board postings based on the identity of the speaker but rather because of the
content of the message. In addition, the author believes that the ability to reply versus the
ability to make people pay attention distinction is of dubious significance and should not
sway courts to draw a constitutional line in this area.
175. For example, if a libel plaintiff generally only reads the bulletin board on which
the defamation appeared once every six months, a court may consider that such plaintiff
does not have "access" to that bulletin board because he or she cannot reasonably be
expected to respond to that defamation soon enough for the response to be effective.
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action to respond, such as calling a press conference; he or she
must wait for the response to be printed in the newspaper, and he
or she will not reach many people who read the libelous story but
not the response.'76
In contrast, a computer bulletin board to which a libel plaintiff
has access is a textbook marketplace for the trade of ideas. By
allowing libel plaintiffs access to nearly instantaneous and universal
counterspeech, the free trade of ideas is allowed to proceed with
almost no marketplace flaws. Michael Godwin, staff counsel of the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, made this point "in connection with
the Suarez case:
[Cyberspace] is the ultimate free-speech medium, where
everybody potentially has the right of reply. In defamation
law, public figures who can hold a press conference and
get attention for their response can't sue for libel very
easily. On a computer network, it's as though everybody is
a public figure, and can answer what's said about them."7
One legal commentator noted how this feature of computer bulletin
boards should affect libel law, and has taken the additional step of
calling for total immunity for all statements made in this medi-
um.1
78
176. For example, the initial defamatory story could be run in a wider-circulated Sunday
newspaper while the response, if the newspaper chooses to print it all, could be printed in
a different day's edition with a lower circulation.
177. Michael Godwin, quoted in Tamar Lewin, If Flames Singe, Who Is to Blame?,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 25, 1994, § 4, at 3 (describing the Electronic Frontier Foundation as
an advocacy group that champions freedom of expression in digital media).
178. See Edward A. Cavazos, Computer Bulletin Board Systems and the Right of Reply:
Redefining Defamation Liability for a New Technology, 12 REv. LrrG. 231, 247 n.88
(1992) (suggesting that a strict application of the right-of-reply theory would point toward
absolute immunity from libel suits for bulletin board users). This position is similar to
that occasionally taken in the traditional media cases that gives absolute immunity for
criticism of public officials, at least as to their official conduct. See New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J., concurring). Another commentator has
taken a different position:
Suppose a cyberspace user writes a defamatory message about another user and
intentionally sends it over the Internet to a dozen other individuals. Is this
situation materially different from sending the same message by fax, mail, or
telegraph? It is hard to see how it could be. The same elements-defamatory
content, publication to third parties, perhaps actual malice, and so on-must be
determined in the eyberspace libel case as elsewhere. Those issues seem indis-
tinguishable from the same issues arising in a non-cyberspace context. In short,
the fact that a communication was an electronic mail message on the Internet
instead of a paper letter through the postal system makes little difference to the
263
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It is true that the response may never "catch up" with the
defamation, because the defamatory posting can be re-posted on
other bulletin boards, printed to paper, or transferred through word
of mouth. This risk, however, is not sufficient to justify a libel
standard lower than actual malice. This is exemplified by the case
of public figures, whose ability to respond to defamatory messages
may never catch up with the defamatory speech.
Although the Supreme Court has stated that the inadequacy of
the rebuttal is a relevant concern,'79 it is not a factor of sufficient
weight to affect the actual malice determination. In addition, this
fear that counterspeech may not be perfect is particularly insuffi-
cient in the computer bulletin board context, where a reply can be
posted nearly instantaneously to the entire audience who had access
to the first message. 8
2. Past Participation-The "Assumption of the Risk" Rationale
The second factor courts weigh in the second prong of the
actual malice doctrine is the actions the libel plaintiff has taken to
thrust him or herself into a public controversy, thereby assuming
the risk of increased scrutiny. Translated to the cyberspace context,
this inquiry should revolve around whether the libel plaintiff has
previously participated in discussions on the bulletin board on
which the defamatory posting appeared.
As recognized by Gertz, the actual malice standard is com-
pelled for circumstances in which the plaintiffs "have thrust them-
selves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to
influence the resolution of the issues involved."'' The theory is
that a public figure, having taken an affirmative step with the
knowledge that he or she may be defamed in the process, assumes
legal outcome.
I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U. PrIT. L. REV. 993,
999 (1994) (footnote omitted).
179. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 n.9 (1974), the court stated,
Of course, an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo harm of defama-
tory falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation is rooted in our experience that
the truth rarely catches up with a lie. But the fact that the self-help remedy of
rebuttal, standing alone, is inadequate to its task does not mean that it is irrele-
vant to our inquiry.
180. See Becker, supra note 12, at 211 (explaining that the heart of computer bulletin
board systems are public message areas in which messages, once posted, can be read by
anyone with access to the bulletin board).
181. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
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the risk of rigorous criticism and must therefore prove the defend-
ant acted with actual malice to recover damages.
In the computer bulletin board context, participants are well
aware of the free, open, and fierce debate that characterizes the
medium.' Thus, like public figures, computer bulletin board us-
ers "run[] the risk of closer ... scrutiny than might otherwise be
the case."'8 In short, a person who posts a message on a bulletin
board should expect to be flamed.
This issue is less important in cyberspace than in the traditional
media, however, because of the overwhelming ability to respond
that those libel plaintiffs with access to the bulletin board en-
joy."4 The ability to remedy the libel by counterspeech allows
the cyberlibel plaintiff to keep his or her name intact. This point
becomes important in the case of lurkers, those libel plaintiffs who
have access to respond to the defamatory posting but who have not
previously posted a message, and thus have not thrust themselves
into a public controversy.
3. Chilling Effect
Finally, courts must examine the probable chilling effect8 5 of
allowing plaintiffs to succeed relatively easily in libel suits arising
from bulletin board speech. As recognized in New York Times, low
fault standards are undesirable because of the risk that they may
deter truthful, protected speech.8 6 The chilling effect represents a
182. Although it is difficult to prove empirically whether people who first sign on to
bulletin boards actually know of the harsh nature of bulletin board debates, certainly plen-
ty of warnings exist in the popular media. See, e.g., Silver, supra note 31, at 98 (warning
potential venturers into cyberspace that users trade insults, lie, and flame other users);
Staples, supra note 30, at A26 (detailing particular episodes of what would normally be
called "verbal venom," but which is transformed into written defamation by computer
bulletin boards).
183. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
184. See supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text (describing the super-access that
persons with access to a computer bulletin board possess).
185. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (describing the chilling effect and its
influence on the development of the actual malice standard).
186. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
[C]ritics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criti-
cism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true,
because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of
having to do so. They tend to make statements which steer far wider of the
unlawful zone.
Id. Subsequent studies show that the Court was justified in this supposition. See, e.g.,
Stephan M. Renas et al., An Empirical Analysis of the Chilling Effect, in THE COST OF
2651995]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
more serious threat to bulletin board users than to journalists in
electronic or print media, because bulletin board users usually have
no one to pay the costs of defending libel suits. Libel lawyer Si-
mon Gallant noted this problem: "People could find themselves
exposed to very costly libel actions in many jurisdictions and at
the end of the day find themselves with huge damage awards
against them. Ultimately that could lead to their bankruptcy.'
8 7
The Suarez case illustrates a prime example of this. Suarez settled
the case because Meeks was considered "uncollectible"'s-Meeks
had incurred a debt of more than $25,000 defending the suit
brought by Suarez.'
Because libel litigation is exceedingly expensive compared to
other types of civil suits,"9 courts faced with this issue must as-
sess the likelihood that truthful, protected speech will be chilled
when determining whether an actual malice standard is constitution-
ally compelled for bulletin board communication. Courts therefore
may want to consider the general makeup of the computer informa-
tion system's users to determine whether speech on that bulletin
board would be severely chilled by a lenient libel standard. 9' In
determining whether the actual malice standard is compelled by the
LIBEL 41, 55 (Everette E. Dennis & Eli M. Noam eds., 1989) (reporting the results from
a survey that showed that a deviation from an actual malice standard would allow plain-
tiffs to win libel suits more frequently, which would, in turn, cause newspapers to be less
likely to publish stories on matters of public concern).
187. Barnes, supra note 4, at 22.
188. Netwatch: News, Culture, Controversy on the Internet, TIME, Sept. 5, 1994, at 20,
20.
189. Id. Some portion of this cost was offset by a defense fund established by Meeks's
supporters, although the amount raised was less than hoped. Marketer Files Suit over
Criticism in Article on Internet, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), July 11, 1994, at 7C.
190. See Henry R. Kaufman, Trends in Damage Awards, Insurance Premiums and the
Cost of Media Libel Litigation, in THE COST OF LIBEL, supra note 186, at 1, 7 (stating
that libel defense costs are greater than in workers compensation cases and amount to
80% or more of all dollars spent by libel insurers of the media). A well-publicized exam-
ple of the high cost of libel litigation involved a suit brought by General William
Westmoreland against CBS, journalist Mike Wallace, and the news program 60 Minutes.
The General alleged that a story, entitled The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception,
was libelous by charging him with a conspiracy to suppress and distort intelligence as to
the size of the enemy's forces. The estimated total cost of the litigation for this case,
which was ultimately withdrawn, ranges from $6.5 to $10 million. LOIS G. FORER, A
CHILLING EFFEcr 22 (1987).
191. For example, speech on Usenet news groups may be deterred more easily than on
local bulletin boards. Many Usenet speakers are college and graduate students, who partic-
ipate at no cost to themselves through their academic institutions. Students presumably
have less wealth reserves than the general population, and therefore, would be easily de-
terred from freely expressing their views because of costly libel litigation.
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First Amendment for bulletin board speech, courts must act to
guard against this chilling effect.
C. Application
Assuming, perhaps somewhat unrealistically, that the chilling
effect is roughly equal among all types of bulletin board systems
and all types of defendants in such cases, the courts will be left
with two variables to consider in determining what fault standard is
appropriate in bulletin board defamation suits against individuals.
The first variable in this determination is whether the plaintiff has
access to the means of counterspeech. Second, courts should con-
sider to what extent the plaintiff has previously participated in
discussions on the bulletin board. For the reasons discussed below,
the more a plaintiff has actively participated on the bulletin board,
then the more the First Amendment requires that he or she prove
actual malice, in accordance with New York Times, to recover
damages."9
1. Libel Plaintiffs with Access
a. Access and Past Participation on the Bulletin Board
The clearest case in which the rationale of the actual malice
standard translates to the context of computer bulletin boards is
where the libel plaintiff is an active participant on the BBS. Those
plaintiffs who have the ability to post a response on the BBS, and
who have consistently participated in public debates by reading and
posting messages, should be required to prove actual malice. By
their extensive past participation in an arena for fierce debate, such
plaintiffs have thrust themselves into a position where they are
subject to criticism, and as such, "he who enters the kitchen must
accept the heat of the fire."'93 More importantly, by possessing
192. It is likely that, at some point in the future, the Court will decide the actual mal-
ice standard no longer adequately protects the First Amendment rights of speakers in
cases involving public figures. See TRIBE, supra note 124, § 12-13, at 886 (describing
how the Court's current balance in libel law between the defendant's First Amendment
rights and the plaintiff's reputational interest "lacks coherence-and, in all likelihood,
staying power"). Similarly, the actual malice standard for active participants on computer
bulletin boards should not be etched in stone. If the Court creates a different constitu-
tional standard for libel plaintiffs who are public figures, then the standard for active
computer bulletin board participants should be correspondingly altered.
193. Rodney A. Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First Amendment: An Analysis of
Hustler v. Falwell, 20 ARIz. ST. U. 423, 457 (1988).
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access to "effective channels of communication," '94 such plaintiffs
are participants in a true marketplace of ideas, and the state may
not skew this market by allowing easy libel recovery.
b. Access with No Past Participation on the Bulletin Board'95
The affirmative step of participating on bulletin board discus-
sions, however, is not necessary for the actual malice standard to
be constitutionally compelled for cyberlibel plaintiffs. Libel plain-
tiffs who enjoy access to the bulletin board on which the libelous
posting appeared but who have taken no affirmative act to assume
the risk of public scrutiny still should be required to prove actual
malice before recovering damages.
A libel plaintiff with access to the bulletin board on which the
defamatory message was posted owns a powerful weapon to com-
bat the libelous statement. Even if the plaintiff has never taken
advantage of this access to post a message, he or she still has the
ability to post a nearly instantaneous and universal response to the
defamation. This super-access to reply channels, far superior than
that enjoyed by public officials and figures, justifies the conclusion
that the First Amendment compels application of the actual malice
standard to all plaintiffs who have access to the bulletin board,
regardless of whether they have previously posted messages on the
BBS.
This situation is best exemplified by the lurker.'96 The libel
plaintiff who has access to the bulletin board meets the first theory
of the second prong-he or she has access to the means necessary
to respond. But if he or she has not previously posted a message,
instead choosing to lurk, it seems unlikely that he or she meets the
second theory, that of assumption of the risk. The lurker has taken
no affirmative step to thrust his or herself into the public spot-
light.'97 Yet the lurker plaintiff should still be required to prove
194. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
195. Although such an occurrence makes for an interesting scenario, rarely is a lurker,
who is not otherwise a public official or figure (for whom the actual malice standard is
already required), defamed on a computer bulletin board. Without the notoriety that comes
with being a public official or figure, and without participating in a discussion on the
bulletin board, a lurker is not likely to become the topic of conversation on the bulletin
board. In this sense, the lurker who is defamed resembles a traditional public figure who
has achieved such status through no purposeful action. The Gertz court recognized that
such instances "must be exceedingly rare." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
196. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (defining this term).
197. That is, unless one considers the act of dialing up a local bulletin board system,
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actual malice, because he or she does have an adequate remedy
available-counterspeech. The lurker, immediately upon reading the
defamatory posting, can hit a "reply" key and post a response,
which will be posted to the same audience that read the initial
defamatory posting.' 98 If the lurker acts fast enough, he or she
may even be able to post the reply before most of the audience
has read the initial posting.
In such a case, it is not dispositive that the lurker, or any other
plaintiff with access but no history of taking part in the bulletin
board's discussions, has not thrust him or herself into a position
where an increased risk of public scrutiny is to be expected. Such
a plaintiff may not have given up any interest in his or her good
name by assuming the risk of increased public scrutiny, but this
fact is not crucial due to the super-access such a plaintiff enjoys to
the channels of response.
2. No Access
The rationale behind extending actual malice protection breaks
down when the libel plaintiff has no practical means of accessing
the bulletin board. Plaintiffs who have no ready access to the bul-
letin board on which the defamation appeared cannot effectively
counter the message, unlike recognized public figures.
Thus, persons with access to computer bulletin boards do not
possess either of the two characteristics that the Gertz Court
claimed separated public figures from private individuals for First
Amendment libel purposes.' Therefore, the First Amendment
does not compel states to require libel plaintiffs who have no ac-
cess to the bulletin board on which the libelous statement was
posted to prove actual malice to recover damages, provided such
plaintiffs are not otherwise public figures.
logging on to the Internet, or subscribing to a commercial on-line service a sufficient
enough step so that the plaintiff should thereby be expected to give up some interest in
his or her name. This Note does not take this position.
198. The Internet Show, supra note 52.
199. In most cases, access should come along with the history of participating-if the
plaintiff has previously posted messages on the bulletin board, he or she will have access
to the BBS. It is possible, however, that a plaintiff could have a history of participating
on the bulletin board but no longer have access to the board. For example, if the plaintiff
sold his or her computer equipment and can no longer sign on to the bulletin board. The
logic of this Note's thesis-that the super-access to channels of reply enjoyed by those
plaintiffs with access to a bulletin board justifies an extension of the actual malice doc-
trine-dictates that should such a situation arise, the First Amendment does not compel
states to require such plaintiffs to prove actual malice to recover damages.
1995]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
D. Responding to Potential Criticisms of this Thesis
1. The "Disincentive Problem"
This standard allows plaintiffs with no practical means of
counterspeech on a bulletin board to recover damages more easily
for the defamatory speech. This does not mean, however, that this
standard creates a serious disincentive for people to acquire the
hardware and knowledge to sign on to a bulletin board, the behav-
ior that society presumably wishes to encourage, or at least not to
discourage.
First, allowing plaintiffs who have no access to the BBS to
more easily recover monetary damages for libel does not create any
disincentive to learn how to use a computer bulletin board or to
acquire the necessary computer hardware. Those persons who have
been defamed and who have access to the bulletin board may not
be able to recover monetary damages because they will have to
prove actual malice. However, they have an effective, and inexpen-
sive, way to make themselves whole-by responding to the defam-
atory message. If this nation truly believes that the "ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas," ° then the de-
famed person will presumably be able to make himself or herself
whole by simply engaging in counterspeech. This has the advan-
tage of being quicker and less expensive than initiating a libel suit.
Even if one does not believe that posting a response is as
adequate a remedy for defamatory speech as monetary damages,
one should not expect that one's status in a libel suit will have any
significant effect on the decision whether to sign on to a bulletin
board. Just as it seems unlikely that the actual malice doctrine in
the traditional media has significantly deterred anyone from seeking
the benefits of public office or the limelight of a public figure,
extending the actual malice doctrine to libel plaintiffs should not
seriously deter anyone from enjoying the benefits of access to
cyberspace."°
200. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
201. Some of the benefits of communicating electronically include communications
speed, low cost of communicating, vast information storage, access to large, diverse audi-
ences, search capabilities, and ease of reproduction. Heinke & Rafter, supra note 34, at 1.
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2. The "Complication Problem"
Libel law is already complicated. The pages of legal texts and
law reviews are replete with scholars bemoaning that the injection
of constitutional law into the tort of libel has caused confusing
rules and doctrines for courts to apply."°e Already, any given libel
suit may necessitate resolution of difficult issues such as whether
the plaintiff is a public official 3 or a public figure, 4 whether
the statement is fact or opinion, 5 and whether the defendant has
acted with the appropriate level of care.'
Some observers are calling for clearer rules governing constitu-
tional libel law. This Note, however, calls for courts to make
yet another determination-whether the libel plaintiff has access to
the necessary means of reply on the bulletin board. As a result,
some commentators may criticize this Note for complicating an
already confusing area of the law.
The thesis of this Note does not, however, create a significant
202. The leading text on tort law states,
[Tihere is a great deal of the law of defamation which makes no sense. It
contains anomalies and absurdities for which no legal writer ever has had a
kind word, and it is a curious compound of a strict liability imposed upon
innocent defendants, as rigid and extreme as anything found in the law, with a
blind and almost perverse refusal to compensate the plaintiff for real and very
serious harm.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 84, § 111 at 771-72; see also Nicole B. Casarez, Puni-
tive Damages in Defamation Actions: An Area of Libel Law Worth Reforming, 32 DUQ.
L. REV. 667, 667 (1994) ("Libel law in America is complex, confusing, expensive, un-
workable and ultimately inefficient."); Rodney A. Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and
Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. LJ.
1519, 1519 (1987) (describing defamation law as "dripping with contradictions and confu-
sion").
203. See, e.g., MIDDLETON & CHAMBERLIN, supra note 79, at 116-17 (summarizing the
courts' attempts to define public officials).
204. See, e.g., Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976),
affd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Defining public figures is much like trying to nail
a jellyfish to the wall.").
205. See, e.g., SANFORD, supra note 128, at 133 ("no area of modem libel law can be
murkier than the cavernous depths of this inquiry").
206. See, e.g., MIDDLETON & CHAMBERLIN, supra note 79, at 128-36 (summarizing the
courts' attempts to apply the actual malice definition); Id. at 137-41 (reviewing the criteria
for determining whether a journalist is negligent).
207. See generally REFORMING LIBEL LAW (John Soloski & Randall P. Bezanson eds.,
1992) (containing several proposals aimed at making libel suits quicker, less expensive,
and less constitutionally perplexing); Randall P. Bezanson, Legislative Reform and Libel
Law, in LIBEL LITIGATION 1992, at 629 (PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary
Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 338, 1992) (setting forth several advantages and disad-
vantages of using legislation to reform libel law).
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complication problem. Rather, it merely proposes an extension of
the actual malice doctrine to situations in which the libel plaintiff
has been defamed on a computer bulletin board and has access to
post a reply. The access determination should not burden courts too
greatly, as it requires a simple common sense determination, which
is no more vague than other areas of the law. The standard will
turn on the reasonableness of the expectation that the plaintiff has
the ability to respond. Courts are quite used to determining reason-
ableness."' In addition, this is a determination that often should
be so clear that it can be disposed of as a matter of law, saving
libel defendants from costly litigation.0 9
E. Overcoming the Court's Resistance to New Technology
Although the Supreme Court has extended First Amendment
protections for libelous speech based on the public nature of the
plaintiff or the speech,"' courts have been much less willing to
extend the protections of the First Amendment to situations in
which new technology is the conduit that transmits the message.
The Supreme Court has been criticized for its unwillingness to
apply the same level of First Amendment protections to users of
new communication technology as it does to users of more tradi-
tional technology such as printed or written communication.' An
208. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 84, §§ 31-32, at 169-93 (describing the im-
portance of the elements "unreasonable risk" and "reasonable person" in negligence tort
law).
209. The Suarez case serves as an example of this, as Benjamin Suarez's own advertise-
ments on the Internet led to Meek's allegedly libelous posting. See supra notes 135-42
and accompanying text (summarizing the relevant facts of Suarez). Since Meeks' bulletin
board was on the Internet, it would seem to follow that Suarez, the plaintiff, could have
replied.
210. See supra notes 78-133 and accompanying text (describing the evolution and
rationale of the public figure test).
211. See ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, THE TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 4 (1983) ("Judges
and legislators have tried to fit technological innovation under conventional legal concepts.
The errors of understanding by these scientific laymen, though honest, have been mam-
moth. They have sought to guide toward good purposes technologies they did not compre-
hend."); Chad E. Milton et al., Emerging Publication Torts, in LIBEL LITIGATION 1994, at
651 (PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No.
389, 1994) ("Law has not kept pace with new technological developments, requiring
courts and practitioners to struggle to fit the 'square peg' of new technology into the
.round holes' of existing copyright, trademark and First Amendment law."); Gregory E.
Perry & Cherie Ballard, A Chip by Any Other Name Would Still Be a Potato: The Fail-
ure of Law and its Definitions to Keep Pace with Computer Technology, 24 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 797 (1993) (criticizing the Supreme Court for decisions involving broadcasting
and computer technology where the Court focused on the technology involved rather than
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especially infamous example of the Court's reluctance is Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC."2 In Red Lion, the Court allowed the
FCC to force a radio station into providing response time for peo-
ple "personally attacked" on the radio station." 3 The Court dis-
missed the broadcasting company's assertion that such an action
would never be held constitutional in the print media context. The
Court stated that "differences in the characteristics of new media
justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to
them.""1 4 Red Lion in general, and this phrase in particular, have
been soundly criticized by legal commentators.2"5
This attitude toward new technology could curtail the First
Amendment rights of computer bulletin board users. Media lawyer
Bruce Sanford noted this possibility and predicted that serious First
Amendment problems may arise as courts attempt to apply libel
law to computer technology: "Courts have been extremely reluctant
to adjust traditional remedies to modem forms of communica-
tion.... Electronic publishing, the transmission of computerized
information for video display or printout, presents another genera-
tion of questions in applying the established rule of defama-
tion." '2 16 This reluctance to retain the core values of the First
Amendment as new technologies emerge has led Laurence Tribe to
propose a constitutional amendment guaranteeing free speech and
press regardless of the technology used to convey the message.2 7
the First Amendment interests which have allegedly been compromised).
212. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
213. I. at 386, 396 (holding that Congress and the Commission did "not violate the
First Amendment when they require[d] a radio [station] . . . to give reply time to answer
personal attacks").
214. Id. at 386-87 (citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952))
(addressing the application of First Amendment protection to motion pictures).
215. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 124, § 12-25, at 1003 ("Mhe decision in Red Li-
on . . . amounted to a chain-breaking departure from the constitutional approach to news-
papers and magazines"); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., The Fairness Doc-
trine Today: A Constitutional Curiosity and an Impossible Dream, 1985 DuKE LJ. 151,
155 (criticizing Red Lion's reliance on the right of people to receive suitable access to
ideas and experiences).
216. SANFORD, supra note 128, at 46.
217. The proposed amendment states,
This Constitution's protections for the freedoms of speech, press, petition, and
assembly, and its protections against unreasonable searches and seizures and the
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, shall be
construed as fully applicable without regard to the technological method or
medium through which information content is generated, stored, altered, trans-
mitted, or controlled.
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If the courts refuse to recognize the functional equivalency of
public figures and cyberlibel plaintiffs with access to computer
bulletin boards, then the actual malice standard certainly would not
be held constitutionally mandated. Extending actual malice protec-
tion to cyberlibel plaintiffs requires nothing more than applying the
rationale the courts have used in their decisions establishing the
actual malice standard. However, the courts have been criticized for
this very failure to apply First Amendment rights established for
traditional media to new communication technologies.
The characteristics of computer bulletin board technology may,
however, hold the key for persuading courts to fully enforce the
protections of the First Amendment in this area. The two major
forces behind the courts' decisions granting lesser First Amendment
protection to users of new technologies have been the "scarcity"
and the "intrusiveness" principles.2"8 The former is illustrated by
Red Lion, in which the Court pointed out that radio, unlike print
media, operates on a limited number of available frequencies as-
signed under a government license." 9 Thus, the Court stated, "the
First Amendment confers no right on licensees to prevent others
from broadcasting on 'their' frequencies and no right to an uncon-
ditional monopoly of a scarce resource which the Government has
denied others the right to use."" The second rationale for grant-
ing new technology less First Amendment protection is the "intru-
siveness" rationale, set forth in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.22' In
Pacifica, the Court allowed the FCC to sanction a radio station
operator for broadcasting a comedy monologue that contained "pa-
Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace: Law and Liberty Beyond the Elec-
tronic Frontier, Address at the First Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy (Mar.
26, 1991) (transcript on file with author); see also Michael Swaine, The Cyberspace
Amendment, 16 DR. DOBBS J. SoFrwARE TOOLS 115 (1991) (reviewing and evaluating
Professor Tribe's proposal).
218. See Philip H. Miller, New Technology, Old Problem: Determining the First Amend-
ment Status of Electronic Information Systems, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 1147, 1150-54
(1993) (summarizing and characterizing the principles behind the Court's decisions regard-
ing First Amendment protection for users of new communication technologies).
219. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-89. For another example of
the scarcity principle at work, see FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468
U.S. 364, 376 n.11 (1984), which sets forth authority supporting Congress's power to
regulate broadcasting facilities due to "spectrum scarcity." Despite criticism of this ration-
ale, the Court stated it will not abandon it "without some signal from Congress or the
FCC that technological developments have advanced so far that some revision of the
system of broadcast regulation may be required." Id.
220. Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. at 391.
221. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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tently offensive" language.'m In so doing, the Court stated that
the "pervasive presence" of radio meant that "indecent material
presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in pub-
lie, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's
right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights
of an intruder.''"m
Computer bulletin boards present neither a scarcity nor an
intrusiveness problem, and thus the courts should not be troubled
by granting bulletin board users the same level of First Amend-
ment protection as users of the fully protected media. Unlike
broadcast technology such as television and radio, computer bulle-
tin boards present no predetermined limit to the spectrum of avail-
able avenues of communication. The vast numbers of computer
bulletin boardsF4 show that bulletin board systems are hardly a
scarce commodity. Further, as the very title "cyberspace" im-
plies,' the only foreseeable limit on the spectrum of available
bulletin board forums is the demand for such systems. The scarcity
rationale is thus not applicable here.
Similarly, computer bulletin boards are not nearly as intrusive
as the Pacifica court found radio. Computer bulletin boards are not
like radios, which the listener turns on not knowing exactly what
will greet him or her-music, talk, commercials, or other program-
ming. Bulletin board systems are grouped by topic and individual
messages usually carry a title indicating the nature of the mes-
sage.' BBS users thus should be fairly warned of the topic be-
fore reading a message. In addition, while bulletin board speech,
like radio communication, does enter the audience's home, comput-
er bulletin boards require a more affirmative step by the audience
to be exposed to the speech than does radio. A BBS user must not
only turn on a computer, but also must log on to the BBS through
the modem, perhaps enter a password, and enter a specific bulletin
board. The individual's right to be left alone certainly is less
strong where he or she has taken such steps to participate in a
bulletin board discussion. Thus, computer bulletin boards do not
pose the same intrusiveness considerations that the Pacifica Court
222. Id. at 731.
223. l at 748.
224. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (providing estimates on the number
of BBSs).
225. For a brief definition of cyberspace, see supra note 1.
226. The Internet Show, supra note 52.
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found troubling about radio.
Courts have shown signs that they are willing to grant a high
level of First Amendment protection to bulletin board users and
similar technology. In addition to the Cubby case, which granted
near-immunity from libel suits for computer bulletin board opera-
tors, 27 at least two cases have granted significant First Amend-
ment protection to users of computer communication technology,
although those cases did not involve libel. The Second Circuit, in
Legi-Tech v. Keiper," accorded full First Amendment protection
of the press to an operator of a computerized information retrieval
service. In Keiper, Legi-Tech, a corporation engaged in marketing a
computerized legislative information service, brought suit against
various New York state officials. The essence of the suit chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a state statute prohibiting Legi-Tech
from subscribing to the state's "Legislative Retrieval Service."229
The court of appeals remanded the district court's preliminary
denial of injunctive relief, concluding that once New York decided
to offer its service, the First Amendment prohibited it from deny-
ing access to Legi-Tech or other competitorsY In so doing, the
court analogized Legi-Tech's technology to an "electronic newspa-
per," and noted that it was "dealing in an area of rapidly develop-
ing technology and ... novel and expanding forms of the exercise
of the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment."
In Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co., 2 a subscriber to Dow Jones'
on-line news retrieval service asserted that he had received a false
news report over the service, on which he relied to his detri-
mentY3 In upholding a long-standing rule that "a news service is
not liable to its readers for negligent false statements," 4 a New
York court held that this technology did not require any different
First Amendment analysis than print media: "The defendant's ser-
vice is one of the modem, technologically interesting, alternative
ways the public may obtain up-to-the minute news. It is entitled to
227. See supra notes 6, 165-70 and accompanying text (summarizing the Cubby case
and the scholarly discussion evaluating it).
228. 766 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1985).
229. Id. at 731.
230. Id. at 734-36.
231. Id. at 732.
232. 520 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Civ. Ct. 1987).
233. Id. at 335.
234. Id. at 336.
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the same protection as more established means of news distribu-
tion." 5 These two cases provide early indications that courts are
more willing to grant computer bulletin board users speech-protec-
tive rights, and thus may be open to requiring cyberlibel plaintiffs
with access to the bulletin board on which the defamatory message
was posted to prove actual malice.3 6
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the fierce nature of communication on computer bulletin
boards, the issue of the appropriate level of First Amendment pro-
tection for libelous statements made on computer bulletin boards
will undoubtedly reach the courts.37 When this happens, courts
will be faced with two options. The first is to narrowly and rigidly
apply existing precedent and require the actual malice standard
only if the plaintiff qualifies as a public official or figure under a
traditional analysis. The second option is to examine the rationale
behind the Supreme Court's earlier decisions establishing the actual
malice doctrine and forge a doctrine for computer bulletin board
defamation that gives effect to both the letter and spirit of libel
precedent. The latter is the better option.
Cyberlibel cases will test our courts' belief in the centerpiece
theory of the First Amendment, the marketplace of ideas. If we
truly are a nation that believes that "truth will out,''238 then the
courts must require a strongly speech-protective rule, such as the
actual malice standard, for libel plaintiffs who have access to the
computer bulletin board on which the defamatory material ap-
peared. If ever a true marketplace of ideas existed, it exists where
the cyberlibel plaintiff can make a nearly instantaneous and univer-
sal response on the bulletin board. Courts should thus require the
actual malice standard regardless of whether the plaintiff has previ-
235. Id at 340.
236. See also Telecommunications Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501
(D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987) (holding that the Fairness Doctrine is
inapplicable to teletext services, a technology permitting display of text and high-resolution
graphics over an unused portion of a broadcast television signal, because of similarities
between teletext and traditional print media).
237. See, e.g., Resnick, supra note 31, at A21 (quoting law professor I. Trotter Hardy
as saying that for cyber-related issues, "the golden age for lawyers is just dawning").
238. This phrase is often cited by courts to convey that truth has a way of revealing
itself sooner or later. It dates back at least to Shakespeare's play, The Merchant of Ven-
ice. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act. 2, sc. 2. ("In the end truth
will out.").
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ously participated in discussions on the bulletin board.
Differences in the technology used to transmit defamatory
messages are no less constitutionally significant than differences in
the public nature of the libel plaintiff or of the message. Where the
libel plaintiff has access to the bulletin board on which the libelous
statement was posted, that plaintiff is functionally equivalent to a
public official or figure in the traditional media because in both
cases the defamed person has a ready means of nearly instanta-
neous and universal response. This equivalency becomes even more
clear where the plaintiff has a history of participating in discussion
on the bulletin board, for in that instance he or she, like a public
official or figure, has thrust himself or herself into a public debate,
thereby inviting a risk of public criticism. However, because of the
super-access possessed by all libel plaintiffs with access to the
bulletin board, this extra step of having previously participated in
discussions on the bulletin board is not necessary. In addition,
because protected speech is easily chilled in this medium, the
courts must carefully allow this fledgling form of expression to
grow by not allowing states to subject bulletin board users to bur-
densome libel laws. In other cases, however, the defamed has no
practical means of responding to the libelous speech via a bulletin
board. As a result, the bulletin board system no longer bears a
resemblance to a marketplace of ideas, and requiring the actual
malice standard vis-a-vis the First Amendment would be inappro-
priate.
Drawing this line, and the constitutional ramifications on both
sides of it, will require courts to be sensitive to the nature of com-
puter bulletin board speech. The frontier mentality characterizing
bulletin board speech must not be casually tossed aside. As Meeks
recognized, "If people start to censor themselves, then we've lost
the heart and soul of the Internet." 9 Given the potential of the
Internet, along with local bulletin board systems and commercial
on-line services, to redefine the way the world communicates, the
courts must not take this possibility lightly.
JEREMY STONE WEBER
239. Netwatch: News, Culture, Controversy on the Internet, supra note 188, at 20.
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